Bibliography on Electronic Monitoring

 

Bibliography on Electronic Monitoring

This bibliography was prepared by JustLeadershipUSA  (JLUSA).  We are grateful to JLUSA for sharing this wonderful resource with the Challenging E-Carceration campaign. We have also added a few entries.

 Please note that this bibliography covers not only academic works but popular press and online media accounts relating to electronic monitoring. While it is not exhaustive, to our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive listing of EM sources in the US yet compiled. As you can see, it is a work in progress. We intend to alphabetize the entries and continue to add new research.

 The bibliography is divided into two parts. Part 1 has reference details for sources, but no description or summary of the article. It is divided into eight sections arranged by topic (a through h).  Part 2 has the reference details but also includes summaries of the articles. These are divided into six sections according to topic (a through f)

 Please note that the summaries do not necessarily represent the assessment or views of JustLeadershipUSA or Challenging E-Carceration but are provided to give the reader a more detailed idea of the content and perspective. Lastly, please note that there is bound to be some ambiguity or difference of opinion as to where an article should be placed so please keep searching.

–James Kilgore

 

Part 1: Sources without summaries:

  1. Immigration Detention
  2. Pre-trial vs. Post-trial usage
  3. Perspective of Officers Enforcing EM
  4. Theoretical/ Ethical Considerations of EM
  5. Private Prison investment
  6. History/Ongoing Development of EM technology
  7. Legal/Judicial Scrutiny
  8. Public Opinion

 

Part 2: Sources reviewed with summaries:

  1. Research on those impacted by EM
  2. Effectiveness of EM
  3. New coverage of EM
  4. POC experiences of EM
  5. Perspectives of those who support EM

 

 

Part 1: Sources without summaries

 

  1. Immigration Detention:

 

Wilsher, Daniel. Immigration detention: law, history, politics. (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Phelan, S. (2010) “Who profits from ICE’s electronic monitoring anklets? San Francisco Bay Guardian Online, March 16, accessed from:  http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2010/03/16/who-profits-ices-electronic-monitoring-anklets-0    on July 9, 2011.

Fisher, Stevens. “Getting Immigrants Out of Detention is Very Profitable,” Mother Jones, September/ October 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/immigration-detainees-bond-ankle-monitors-libre/.

Henessey-Fiske. “Immigrants Object to Growing Use of Ankle Monitors After Detention,” LA Times, August 2, 2015. http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-immigrant-ankle-monitors-20150802-story.html

Rinaldi, Tiziana. “Many women seeking asylum in the US have been released from detention — but with ankle monitors,” PRI, March 10, 2016. https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-10/many-women-asylum-seekers-have-been-released-detention-ankle-monitors

Brown, Paulette. Paulette Brown to the Honorable Jeh Johnson, March 18, 2016, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/ABALetter_anklemonitors2016.authcheckdam.pdf.

“Lawyers: Immigrant Mothers Coerced into Ankle Bracelets,” Al Jazeera America, July 27, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/27/lawyers-immigrant-mothers-coerced-to-wear-ankle-monitors.html.

Suarez, Linet. “Liberty at the Cost of Constitutional Protections: Undocumented Immigrants and Fourth Amendment Rights.” 48.2 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 153, 185 (2016).

Knaub, Kelly. “ICE Hit with FOIA Lawsuit Over Relationship With Bond Co.” Law360, October 13, 2015, accessed on June 14, 2017. https://www.law360.com/articles/713078/ice-hit-with-foia-suit-over-relationship-with-bond-co

            “In the past, the company has threatened to cancel bonds it has already posted on behalf of immigrants and remand them back into ICE custody, it says.” Shows an implicit connection with ICE.

 2. Pretrial vs. Post Incarceration:

 

Terry L., Maxfield, Michael G. “Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring: Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs.” Crime & Delinquency 36 no. 4 (1990): 251.

 3. Perspective of Officers/ Admin. Enforcing EM:

 

Altman, R. N., Murray, R. E., & Wooten, E. B. “Home confinement: A ‘90s approach to community supervision.” Federal Probation, 61 (1997): 30-32.

Friel, Charles M.; Vaughn, Joseph B. “A Consumer’s Guide to the Electronic Monitoring of Probationers.” Federal Probation 50 no. 3 (1986): 3-14.

Hucklesby, A. “Insiders’ views: Offenders’ and staff’s experiences of electronically monitored curfews.”  In Electronically Monitored Punishment: International and Critical Perspectives, edited by Nellis M., Beyens K., Kaminski D., 228-246. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Schmidt, Annesley K. “Electronic Monitors—Realistically, What Can Be Expected?” Federal Probation 55 (1991): 47-53.

Blackwell, B.S., Payne, B.K. & Prevost. “Measuring Electronic Monitoring Tools: The Influence of Vendor Type and Vendor Data,” Journal of American Criminal Justice (2011) 36: 17.

 

 

 

 

 

 4. Theoretical/ Ethical Considerations in EM:

 

Carney, Molly, “Correction through Omniscience: Electronic Monitoring and the Escalation of Crime Control”, 40 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 279 (2012).

Ball, Richard A.; Lilly, J. Robert. “A Theoretical Examination of Home Incarceration.” Federal Probation 50.1 (1986): 17-24.

Sean P. Hier & Josh Greenberg eds.“Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics” (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).

Shklovski, I. et al. (2009) “The commodification of location: Dynamics of power in location-based systems.” Paper presented to the International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, Orlando, Florida. October 2.

Marx, Gary, “Ethics for the New Surveillance,” Information Society 171 no. 41 (1998).

Jones, R. “The electronic monitoring of offenders: penal moderation or penal excess?” Crime Law and Social Change 62 (2014): 475.

Chin, Gabriel J. “The New Civil Death: Rethinking punishment in the era of mass conviction.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 160, no. 6 (2012): 1789-833.

Lilly, J. Robert, Nellis, Mike. “The Limits of Techno-Utopianism: Electronic Monitoring in the United States of America,” in Electrically Monitored Punishment edited by Beyens, Kristel, Kaminsk, Dan, and Nellis, Mike, 21. (London: Routledge Books, 2013).

Houk, Julie M. “Electronic Monitoring of Probationers: A Step toward Big Brother.” Golden Gate University Law Review 14 no. 2 (1984): 431-446.

Kilgore, James, Electronic Monitoring is Not the Answer: Critical Reflections on a Flawed Alternative 12 (Oct. 2015), http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ EM-Report-Kilgore-final-draft-10-4-15.pdf. Center For Media Justice

Nellis M., Beyens K., Kaminski D. Electronically Monitored Punishment: International and Critical Perspectives. New York: Routledge (2013).

Dobson, Jerome E., and Peter F. Fisher. “The Panopticon’s Changing Geography.” Geographical Review 97, no. 3 (2007): 307-23.

Fabelo, Tony. “‘Technocorrections’: The Promises, the Uncertain Threats.” Sentencing & Corrections: Issues for the 21st Century 5 (2000): 1-7.

5. Private Prison Investment:

Eisenberg, Avlana K., “Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era,” Vanderbilt Law Review 69 no.1 (2016): 71.

Richard A. Ball, Lilly, J. Robert. “Selling Justice: Will Electronic Monitoring Last?” North Kentucky Law Review 20 (1993): 529–30.

In the Public Interest. “GEO Group and Corrections Corporation of America spend billions of taxpayer dollars purchasing smaller companies Fact Sheet,” https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_PrivatePrisonsMnA_FactSheet_Sept2016.pdf (accessed June 9, 2017).

Cohen, Donald. “The Private Prison Industry Has a Backup Plan.” The Huffington Post, September 7, 2016, accessed June 9, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/the-private-prison-indust_b_11996936.html

Joseph, George. “The Private Prison Industry’s New Criminal Justice Ventures.” The Atlantic’s CityLab, September 14, 2016, accessed June 9, 2017. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/09/the-private-prison-industrys-new-criminal-justice-ventures/499964/

Stillman, Sarah. “Get Out of Jail, Inc.” The New Yorker, June 23, 2014, accessed June 9, 2017. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc

Investigate. “G4S plc,” http://investigate.afsc.org/company/g4s-plc (accessed June 9, 2017).

Investigate. “The GEO Group.” http://investigate.afsc.org/company/geo-group-inc (accessed June 9, 2017).

Investigate. “3M.” http://investigate.afsc.org/company/3m-company (accessed June 9, 2017).

 6. History of EM/ Ongoing Development of Technology:

Lilly, J Robert. “A brief history of house arrest and electronic monitoring.” Northern Kentucky Law Review 13, no. 3 (1987): 343- 347.

Lilly, J. Robert, (2006) “Issues Beyond Empirical EM Reports,” Criminology and Public Policy. Vol 5, No. 1. 93-101.

Berry, Bonnie. “Electronic Jails: A New Criminal Justice Concern.”  Justice Quarterly 21 no. 1(1985): 1-22.

Black, Matt, Smith, Russell G. “Electronic Monitoring in the Criminal Justice System” 2 (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 254, 2003), http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/ tandi254.pdf.

Burrell, W. and R. Gable. (2008) “From B.F. Skinner to Spiderman to Martha Stewart: The past, present, and future of electronic monitoring of offenders.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 46 (3/4) 101-108

Schwitzgebel,  Robert L. “A Belt from Big Brother,” Psychology Today, April 1969.

Schwitzgebel, Ralph K. “Electronic Innovation in Behavioral Sciences.” American Psychologist 22 (1967): 364-370.

Holden, Alan and Shuler, Kara. “Beyond the Bars, A new model of ‘virtual incarceration’ for low-risk offenders.” Deloitte University Press, March 4, 2013, accessed June 9, 2017. https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/industry/public-sector/beyond-the-bars.html

7. Legal/ Judicial Scrutiny:

Murphy, Erin. “Paradigms of Restraint.” Duke Law Journal 57 no. 5 (Mar. 2008): 1321-1411.

Del Carmen, R.,& Vaughn, J. “Legal issues in the use of electronic surveillance in probation.” Federal Probation 50 (1986): 60-69

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

 8. On the “Public Opinion:”

Brown, Michael P., Elrod, Preston. “Electronic House Arrest: An Examination of Citizen Attitudes.” Crime & Delinquency 41 (1995): 332-346.

Cullen, Francis T. , Gregory A. Clark, and John F. Wozniak. 1985. “Explaining the Get Tough Movement: Can the Public be Blamed?” Federal Probation 49:16-24.

 

Part 2: Sources reviewed with summaries

 

  1. Research on the experiences of those impacted by EM:

 

Gainey, Randy R., Payne, Bryan K. “The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Released from Jail or Prison: Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the Incarceration Experience,” The Prison Journal 84 (2004): 413-435.

Provides a broad summary of common arguments regarding EM, including the Orwellian nature since its commercial inception in 1984, the different manifestations/implications of its use (retroactive, pre/post trial, over application, etc.); EM’s effectiveness, economic practicality, and versatility; and the philosophic considerations of home versus prison with EM. Authors are invested in EM’s possibility for more seamless re-entry into society, and avoidance of “criminogenic” nature of jail, especially when coupled with rehabilitation/ treatment programs.  Survey focused on sample of 49 people (under half being white, majority male and unmarried, av. age 37) in one county who had sentences with a combination of jail time, work release, and house arrest with EM through open as well as close ended questions on their experiences and perceptions of EM. Study showed that those experiencing EM found it moderately punitive, moderately affecting towards social relations, and the positive aspects of enabling those with EM to assist in family/house work and contribute financially through work. Authors’ finding that escape was not a sustainable consideration for those on EM, the positive impact of surveillance as well as train on family ties, and the similarity between incarceration and EM in regards to control and loss of freedom, though perceived differently quantitatively and ultimately superior to jail time.

  • Differences between jail and prison were summarized by the authors as “the amount of control, the maintenance of family ties, the ability to maintain employment, and time for reflection” (428).
  • Policy recommendations include clearly communicating to incarcerated people the implications of EM, there should be broader education on EM for policy makers, the public, and the media, and lastly, that “community-based sanctions and more traditional sanctions” (431) can be combined for positive results (though not without problems).

Lilly, R., & Jenkins, J. (1989, Oct 06). “Life with the tag: Do criminals prefer tagging to incarceration.” New Statesman & Society, 2, 23.

Example of American academic’s attempt to convince the public of the positive, liberal potential of EM through accessible examples of its (complicated) successes in America to a British audience. Popular article provides case studies showcasing primary positive case studies for EM, especially on the psychological impacts suggesting its supposed potential to embarrass/scare people straight. Argues for a more open-minded perspective on the usage and role of EM.

May, David C. and Wood, Peter B. “What Influences Offenders’ Willingness to Serve Alternative Sanctions.” The Prison Journal 48 no. 5, (2005): 145-167.

Funded by an Oklahoma state prison, this report is from the perspective of those working in the criminal justice industry seeking to understand what demographic factors affect people’s’ attitudes on alternative sentences instead of serving jail/prison time, including boot camp, probation, and community service in order to inform prison policy/ practices, and the indicator that is most influential in determining amount of time a person will commit to an alternative over prison time. With a sample size of 415 men and women convicted for nonviolent offenses, this study seeks to provide a multivariate perspective on incarcerated people’s attitudes and experiences of EM. Portrays previous research on EM as overwhelmingly ultimately against EM, as it is overly punitive, long, and invasive, and that people ultimately prefer serving time in jail/prison and then being free without restrictions.  This report seeks to complicate studies that supposedly simplistically consider factors as responsible for being for/against EM, forming the study around seven inmates’ contributions. Their findings were that younger, more educated, those with previous experience serving alternative sanctions. Women were found to be willing to serve a higher proportion of alternative sentencing to prison time, though otherwise the factor was statistically insignificant. Demographic associations and attitudes are largely dependent on type of sanction (boot camp, house arrest with EM, and community service).

 

Doherty, Diana. “Impressions of the Impact of the Electronic Monitoring Program on the Family.” Pp. 129-139 in Electronic Monitoring and Corrections: The Policy, the Operation, the Research, edited by K. Schulz. (Burnaby, Canada: Simon Fraser University, 1995).

Petersilia, Joan, Deschenes, Elizabeth P. “What Punishes? Inmates rank the severity of prison vs. intermediate sanctions.” Federal Protection 58, no. 1 (1994): 3.

This report focuses on incarcerated people’s perceptions on the level of punishment of alternative sanctions versus prison time. Authors argue that for some demographics (young black men primarily) prison is not as punitive as it once was due to mass incarceration and its increasing commonality. Authors argue that in order to convince politicians and policy to invest in alternative sanctions, it is important to show that incarcerated individuals consider EM and other alternatives to be as punitive as jail/prison time with less of the financial burden on the state. Report’s background research to assert that those with experience within the criminal justice system prefered to serve time in prison/jail as opposed to alternative probation measures, including EM. This study seeks to measure incarcerated people’s attitudes towards alternative sanctions, demographics that affect this, and ranking of difficulty of probation requirements. Sample was 50% white, majority POC were black, average age was 26, majority property offenses, serving on average a 17 month prison sentence, one third had previously served a prison sentence, and about half had less than a high school education. House arrest (with EM) was considered the most punitive alternative to prison of all the alternative probationary sanctions. Report advocates for considering the punitive nature of these alternatives to convince those who consider punishment to be prison or nothing to broaden their understanding of incarceration options.

Wood, Peter B., Grasmick, Harold G. “Toward the Development of Punishment Equivalencies: Male and Female Inmates Rate the Severity of Alternative Sanctions Compared to Prison,” Justice Quarterly 19, 19 (1999).

May, David P., Payne, Bryan K., Wood, Peter B. “The ‘Pains’ of Electronic Monitoring: A Slap on the Wrist or Just as Bad as Prison?” Criminal Justice Studies 27 no. 2 (2014): 133-145.

This study seeks to compare the perceptions of those incarcerated and those under EM  of the relative punitiveness of their respective punishments. This report seeks to look at the long-term effects of EM through examining the retrospective perspective of those who experienced EM previously and its effect on people, as well as comparing perceptions of EM between those who experienced it and those who had not. Provides a helpful history of the usage and technology of EM and an overview of past research that shows that EM has been often considered comparable to prison as well as its own set of EM specific negative aspects, including strain on family relations and monetary burden. Results of this study show that those who had never experienced EM view it as less punitive than those who had experienced it, of a sample of over 1200 people in a Midwestern penitentiary. Results showed that Black offenders were more likely to have experienced EM than white offenders, complementing research that shows POC view EM as more negative than their white counterparts. This could be due to POC’s disproportionate incarceration rates, their greater exposure to EM (and therefore their more negative opinions towards it), or that POC are more likely to receive sentencing with EM.  Gendered dress affects element of shame for those with an ankle bracelet, as women report higher levels of shame due to its greater visibility with conventional clothes for women. Warrants further study into racialized usage of EM.

Martin J.S., Hanrahan K., Bowers J.H. “Offenders’ perceptions of house arrest and electronic monitoring,” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 48(6) (2009): 547–570.

Background research supports theory that being “in” prison is no more punitive than being “out” but under EM, though most research showed EM to be more desirable ultimately than prison time. Raises questions about relative safety of home arrest with EM vs. jail- seems to be a rather unexplored research question. Study utilized the Gainey and Payne survey (2000). Research questions focused on whether people under house arrest with EM viewed it as punitive and to what extent it impacted their work/home life as well as their relationships. Sample consisted of people who had experienced HA with EM in three counties in Western PA. Questions focused on concerns regarding “freedom,” “shame,” and “intrusiveness” measured by a myriad of factors. Sample was disproportionately white and serving time for DUI offenses.

  • “The typical respondent spent approximately one month (27.03 days) on HA with EM and paid $3,578.00 in fines” (561). “nearly one-third of our respondents would prefer to spend a month in jail rather than six months on HA” (566). 22% surveyed agreed with the statement that EM on HA “turns the home into a prison,” but furthers idea that family members experience effects of EM along with the person facing punishment.

Kilgore, J. “Progress or More of the Same? Electronic Monitoring and Parole in the Age of Mass Incarceration.” Critical Criminology 21 (2013): 123.

Focuses on the effects of EM for those on parole, as it is the most legislated, most studied, and most common surveilled manifestation of it. Kilgore’s logic is that the precedents set in parole will proliferate in other types of cases. Points out that EM has become common in the age of mass incarceration, which largely focuses on punishment (rather than rehabilitation)– to think creatively and critically about EM, we must acknowledge the theoretical limitations of the age of incarceration. Outlines many of the concerns related to EM, including stress on family, impact on employment, and its reuse of the “punishment paradigm,” instead of focusing on rehabilitation.  Uses anecdotal case studies to make the case that it makes the home a prison. Push/Pull factors described as push for alternatives to incarceration and pull factor being private companies’ investment in EM. Points out that EM can be sold to policy makers and business people as both cutting in costs for the government and raising profits for companies- giving incentive to put more people in EM. Local authorities are reported to have made a profit through increasing daily fees.

  • Can be reported to be “cost effective but income generating as well” (136). Shows background research that the state will be compelled to give EM to more people than would have previously had a comparable level of control by the state.
  • “If the underlying ethos of EM is not transformed, the US could easily end up with a proliferation of high security prisons not in isolated rural areas but in the overcrowded houses of poor people of color in urban communities”(137).

Hucklesby, A. “Vehicles of desistance? The impact of electronically monitored curfew orders,” Criminology and Criminal Justice 8(1) (2008): 51–71.

Staples W.G., “The everyday world of house arrest: Collateral consequences for families and others.”  In Civil Penalties, Social Consequences edited by Mele C., Miller T., 139-159.  New York: Routledge, 2005.

As of 2003, more than 70,000 people are serving time through central monitoring systems.

  • Staples argues that much of the research regarding EM is a “blending of the institutional confinement of the past and the more futuristic possibility of being monitored in everyday life” (142).

Staples is concerned with looking at the dynamics of family life under house arrest. One of the principle pros that advocates of EM use is that people are able to maintain family relations while serving time. Staples argues that the family absorbs some of the role of surveillance that the state instigates and forces those experiencing EM as well as their family members  to negotiate the boundaries of family and invasive surveillance. Staples conducted 23 interviews with people in the Kansas Metropolitan area. Participants voice strains on the family including through phone calls late in the night, inability to attend family events, and embarrassment. For those experiencing EM, the stress of committing a violation and ending up in jail is a constant presence. Furthers concept that EM may weaken family ties, not strengthen them.

King D. and Gibbs A. “Is home detention in New Zealand disadvantaging women and children?” Probation Journal 50(2) (2003): 115–126.

Vanhaelemeesch, D. & Vander Beken, T. “Between convict and ward: the experiences of people living with offenders subject to electronic monitoring,” Crime, Law, and Social Change (2014) 62: 389.

  • “On the one hand, co-residents report changes in their daily and social life that make them feel as if they are also being punished. On the other hand, they see themselves as active in the administration of the punishment, becoming assistants, social workers and controllers of the electronic monitoring sanction and taking up roles as private individuals that were previously fulfilled by government” (389).

Focuses on studying 30 people who live with those under EM in Belgium.

Koran, Mario. “Lost Signals Disconnected Lives.” Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism, March 24, 2013, accessed June 9, 2017. http://wisconsinwatch.org/2013/03/lost-signals-disconnected-lives/

Continuous threat of malfunction of GPS.

  • “I never knew when I was going to go back to jail,” Murphy said. “It was psychological torture.”
  • “Hicks has been booked into jail at least a dozen times since April 2011 for violations related to his GPS monitor, spending a total of 74 days behind bars.”
  • “The records show that Hicks, 39, who served 12 years for having intercourse with an unconscious woman, has asked on multiple occasions to have his parole revoked and be sent back to prison. He told the Center he did so because, in prison, he knew what was expected of him.”
  • “Gable estimates that 250,000 individuals are being electronically monitored in the United States today, about one in 10 by GPS technology. More widely used is radio frequency monitoring, which tethers individuals to a base station inside their homes, effectively a form of house arrest. If they travel outside the perimeter without approval, authorities are notified.”
  • “‘GPS tracking is an example of public fear that has been augmented by politicians who want to be tough on crime,’ Gable said. ‘It’s a wayward technology that has become warped into a punishment routine.’”
  • “In 2007, a legislative study committee in Arizona measured the effectiveness of using GPS technology to track offenders. It found that the 140 offenders monitored that year experienced a total of 35,601 false alerts, due to problems such as low batteries or signals lost in dead zones. The study group found 463 confirmed violations, meaning that false alerts outnumbered proven infractions by a 77-1 margin.”
  • “In fiscal year 2011-12, the state paid BI $4.2 million for services including GPS monitoring units, home monitoring units, and electronic alcohol-detection units, according to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau. The DOC was unable to say how much was specifically spent on GPS.”

Spelman, W. “The severity of intermediate sanctions,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 32(2): 107–135 (1995).

Argues that alternative types of punishment are the future of corrections, both for efficiency and cost- but greatly differentiates between options.  In Texas, 128 recently convicted people experienced a range of alternative sanctions.

  • “75% of offenders rated one or more intermediate sanctions as more severe than an incarcerative sanction…” (107).
  • “The question of interest, then is not whether there is any range of imprisonment and non prison sanctions that would be perceived as interchangeable, but whether, within the range of sanctions typically applied, there is sufficient scope for interchangeability that the concept can be practically useful” (109).

Believes offenders are fundamentally “different” than the rest of us, and believes that punishment should be measured by how they experience it, not how the general public perceives it.

  • “Average offender rated five punishments as about equally severe as a 1 year jail term: 6 months in a restitution center, 6 months in a boot camp, 1 year in a treatment facility, 1 year on electronic monitoring, and 2 years on intensive supervision probation” (119).

Researchers seek to address the question of why many people would prefer jail time to a longer, intensive supervision sentence, and attributes it to a number of factors:

  • “The county in which the offender was adjudicated, the length and type of sentence the offender assumed… the offender’s criminal record… the offender’s demographic characteristics…” (122).
  • “Holding all other variables constant, 87% of Black respondents preferred a short jail term to 2 years on intensive supervision; 68% of Hispanics felt this way, but only 41% of White and Pacific Asian respondents did” (123).
  • “Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to prefer jail to intensive supervision, and their comments suggest that differences in supervision may be one reason. A Houston drug dealer, interviewed prison, told us, ‘Intensive supervision is hard on a Black man. Blacks get treated worse, even by Black POs’” (125).
  • Points to the subjective nature of sanctions, how offenders perceive their enforcement due to demographic differences:

“…two offenders may receive the same number of exchange units– or even identical punishments– but perceive the severity of their punishment to be very different due to differences in their age, race, sex, prior punishment history, or other factors” (132).

Argues that findings show that a spectrum of sanctions does indeed exist. And that

  • “The most efficient punishments available are all community sanctions. Regular probation, intensive supervision probation, and various probation conditions such as community service and mandatory employment all deliver significant punishment all deliver significant punishment at relatively low cost” (127).

Looking for bang for their buck in terms of punishment for cost.

Schener, Maya. “The Quiet Horrors of House Arrest, Electronic Monitoring, and Other Alternative Forms of Incarceration.” Mother Jones, Jan. 22, 2015, accessed June 14, 2017. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/01/house-arrest-surveillance-state-prisons

Describes different case studies related to alternative forms of incarceration, including sex offender registries, EM, probation, and drug testing. Raises questions about the long-standing precedent for surveillance on people outside of prison contexts, especially related to sex offenders, which increased during the 1990s.

  • “As mass incarceration is falling out of fashion—it’s been denounced by figures across the political spectrum from Eric Holder to Newt Gingrich—a whole slate of “alternatives to incarceration” has arisen. From electronic monitoring and debilitating forms of probation to mandatory drug testing and the sort of “predictive policing” that turns communities of color into open-air prisons, these alternatives are regularly presented as necessary ‘reforms’ for a broken system.”
  • “As an idea, the Panopticon remains embedded in our notion of state discipline. Now, it is spreading out of the prison and into the neighborhood and the home, which is hardly surprising in a society in which surveillance and monitoring are becoming the accepted norms of everyday life. Like the plans of the early reformers, many current prison ‘reforms’ share a common element: they perpetuate the fantasy that new forms of confinement, isolation, and surveillance will somehow set us all free.”

2. “Effectiveness” of EM:

 

Belur, Jyoti and Amy Thornton, “Electronic Monitoring of Offenders,” What Works, 2016 http://whatworks.college.police.uk/About/News/Pages/Electronic-monitoring.aspx

This is an overview of all EM research done in English at a global level since 1999. The authors examined 372 studies, finding just 17 that attempted to measure recidivism or reoffending. Their conclusion was that they could not make a definite statement as to whether or not EM had an impact on reoffending. This is probably the most definitive look at EM research to date, though perhaps the most important information if conveys is that there is not much research on EM and what exists is not very rigorous.

Bonta, James, Rooney, Jennifer, and Wallace-Capretta, Suzanne. “A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of an Intensive Rehabilitation Supervision Program.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 27 no. 3: 312-329.

Study looked at the impact of intensive rehabilitation supervision on recidivism. The usage of EM was often involved in this process, and the discussion section touches on the role of EM in recidivism. Authors argue that while EM did not have a substantial effect on recidivism, it did enable the intensive rehabilitative program that proved to have an effect on recidivism for high risk offenders.

Cullen, Francis. T. , John P. Wright, and Brandon K. Applegate. “Control in the Community: The Limits of Reform?” in Choosing Correctional Options That Work: Defining the Demand and Evaluating the Supply, edited by A. T. Harland, 69-116. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.

Chicago Community Bond Fund, “Punishment is not a service,” October 24, 2017 https://chicagobond.org/docs/pretrialreport.pdf

This is a review of the outcomes of the first two months of the Chicago bond court in which judges were mandated to set bond (bail) at a level the person charged said they could afford. Among other things, this review looks at the history of EM in Cook County (where Chicago is located) and how it was applied as part of the county’s strategy to reduce jail populations. The authors are wary of the use of EM and knowledgeable about the punitive nature of most EM regimes. The report contains some very valuable interview material of young people who were on EM. The research team of Challenging E-Carceration helped prepare the section on EM.

Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic, East Bay Community Law, “Electronic Monitoring of Youth in the California Juvenile Justice System,” 2017 https://chicagobond.org/docs/pretrialreport.pdf

This pioneering study combines the practical experience of the researchers with a rigorous collection of juvenile justice policy documents from the 58 counties of California. The report is highly critical of the use of EM on juveniles, noting some extremely punitive and at times irrational practices as well as analysis from psychology researcher concerning the inappropriateness of EM for juvenile minds that are not yet fully developed.

Gainey, R. R., Payne, B. K., & O’Toole, M. “The relationships between time in jail, time on electronic monitoring, and recidivism: An event history analysis of a jail-based program.” Justice Quarterly 17 no. 4 (2000): 733-752.

Looks at the relationship between time spent in jail, on electronic monitoring, and recidivism based on a sample of people all who had experienced EM at one point in their sentencing process. Provides background research on other studies looking at rates of recidivism based on time incarcerated in prison, synthesizing mixed results to be dependant on a variety of offenders’ characteristics. Study analyzed an EM program in Virginia, which included drug/alcohol testing, paying for an EM system, and responding to officers’ phone calls. Offenders served a varying amount of their sentence on EM, as well as in prison and on work release. Results found that EM reduced that rate of recidivism, dependant on the nature of the offender. Found that a short time in jail for first time offenders, followed by EM proves effective in reducing recidivism. Found that longer term jail time increases recidivism. EM enables less societal shaming and outcasting that has been shown to increase recidivism (depending on familial factors). Argues that it is still punitive, but should be pushed forward in policy discussions and public awareness. Lays out many unanswered questions to be looked at by researchers.

Bales, William D, Blomberg, Thomas G., Padgett, Kathy G. “Under Surveillance: An empirical test of the effectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring.” Criminology & Public Policy 5 no. 1 (2006): 61-91.

Examines over 75,000 offenders in Florida from 1998-2002 placed on EM. One factor when considering EM’s effectiveness is as “alternative to incarceration versus an enhancement that results in net-widening has been the comparison of the relative “risk” to public safety of offenders sentenced to EM and offenders sentenced to community supervision without EM.”  The three methods measured in the study were “revocation for a new offense,1 revocation for a technical violation, and absconding from supervision.” Study showed that there was very little evidence for any net-widening effect of EM. Not surprisingly, EM was shown to reduce the rates of violation of home confinement as compared to those on home confinement without EM. This article is from an earlier period when EM was largely considered a way to enforce house arrest, as opposed to its own distinct sanction (See below article’s quote).

Bonta, J., & Rooney, J., Wallace-Capretta, S. “Can electronic monitoring make a difference?” Crime and Delinquency 46 (2000): 61-75.

This study examined three groups of people in British Columbia, one group on EM, one incarcerated, and one on probation. Study challenges many common assumptions about EM, including supposed cost savings and overwhelming and unparalleled reductions in recidivism. Study shows that there is no significant difference in recidivism between probationers and those placed on EM. Additionally, authors challenged the argument that EM is less expensive due to the net-widening effect of EM. Due to the net-widening effect of EM, as well as the low-risk nature of those largely put on EM, so lower rates of recidivism cannot be simply attributed to the merits of EM. The enforcers of EM significantly affected the attitudes of those on EM- officers versus probation officers. Argues that if the goal of EM is program completion, then success rates are relatively high. Regarding recidivism, authors are not convinced of its effectiveness.

  • “The original intention of EM was to enforce house arrest and later it became a community-based alternative to incarceration.”

Cavanagh, D. P. “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Prison Cell Construction and Alternative Sanctions.” BOTEC Analysis Corporation (1991).

Ralph Kirkland Gable, “Application of Personal Telemonitoring to Current Problems in Corrections.” 14 Journal of Criminal Justice 167, 172–73 (1986).

Conway, Peggy, “Survey of Agencies Using Electronic Monitoring Reveals a Promising Future.” Justice Offender Monitoring, Summer/Fall 2003.

Vandevelde, Stijn, Vanhaelemeesch, Delphine, and Vander Beken, Tom. “Serving Time Behind the Front Door: Electronic Monitoring Programs Provide Prison Alternatives,” European Journal of Criminology 11 no. 3 (2014).

Worrall, A. “Community sentences.” In The Sage Dictionary of Criminology, edited by E. Mclaughlin and J. Munchie, 44-45.  London: Sage, 2001.

Spelman, W. “The severity of intermediate sanctions,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 32(2): 107–135 (1995). Mair G. and Nee C. “Electronic Monitoring: The Trials and Their Results.” Home Office Research Study 120. (London: Home Office).

Study surveys 178 offenders on their experiences/perceptions of varying sanctions. Study findings promote the existence of a continuum of sanctions and their severity for offenders. Spelman argues that there are “A wide variety of alternatives to incarceration [that] can deliver more punishment than can a short jail or prison term, and at a fraction of the cost” (132). Argues for the need to develop a “rational” scheme for rating severity of alternative sanctions through a system of “exchange units” of punishment of their choice. EM was found to have a high cost benefit as well as moderate levels of severity depending on type of offender and experience within the criminal justice system.

Renzema M. and Mayo-Wilson E. “Can electronic monitoring reduce crime for moderate to high-risk offenders?” Journal of Experimental Criminology 1(2) (2005) : 215–237.

This review examines the effectiveness of EM for low and high risk offenders based on three studies. As of 2005, cites that over 100,000 people in the United States and over 150,000 people in Europe are on electronic monitoring (215). “As this and other reviews find, EM has not demonstrated superiority to options such as penal code reform, intensive probation, or psychotherapy in reducing the burden of imprisonment or in reducing recidivism among moderate to high-risk offenders” (216).

  • First study reviewed examines high risk offenders in Georgia and finds that EM produces temporary results, but after completion has little effect. “Within three years of release, 23.4% of the EM group (n = 128) and 23.4% of an historical comparison group (n = 158) were returned to prison” (228).
  • Second study reviewed examined high, moderate, and low risk offenders in 2000 in Newfoundland with EM to enforce compliance with a treatment program in conjunction with a court order. “Although suggestive, it is impossible to gauge whether higher completion rates were due to EM or due to the threat of revocation” (230).
  • Final study “examined EM compared to combination and community service orders” in England. No perceptible difference in recidivism was found for EM in the years following the program.
  • “After 20 years, it is clear that EM has been almost desperately applied without adequate vision, planning, program integration, staff training, and concurrent research.”

Killias M., Gilliéron G., Kissling I. “Community service versus electronic monitoring – What works better? Results of a randomized trial,” British Journal of Criminology 50(6) (2010): 1155–1170.

Study compares the effectiveness of two popularized alternative sanctions: randomized assignment of community service and electronic monitoring through looking at rates of reoffending and other social integration including marriage status and financial stability in Switzerland. Community service programs usually consist of assisting in welfare/ elderly centers or cleaning public spaces. Electronic monitoring consisted of curfew enforced with radio frequency technology (unable to track people’s movements, simply presence in their homes or not for purposes of curfew enforcement). Both groups had access to treatment programs for alcohol/drug abuse.  Between the two groups, reconviction rates did not significantly differ. Found few differences between the two groups in terms of self-reported offending. Community service was found to be more motivating than EM. Some factors seems to be marginally better with EM versus community service depending on a series of factors. Argues for the expanding of EM over community service.

Finn, M.A. and Muirhead-Steves, S. “The effectiveness of electronic monitoring with violent male parolees,”Justice Quarterly 19(2) (2002): 293–312.

Koran, Mario.“Lawmakers hold up funding for GPS tracking, calls for study.” Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism, May 22, 2014, accessed June 9, 2017. http://wisconsinwatch.org/2013/05/lawmakers-hold-up-some-funding-for-gps-tracking/

  • State Rep Richards: “It’s a public safety issue. Every minute we have police or parole agents chasing their tails, arresting people for false positives, we might be missing the people who are committing new crimes. And we’re potentially wasting thousands of dollars.”
  • Costs: “The Joint Finance Committee approved $5.5 million over the next two years to pay for GPS expansion. But it withheld a supplemental appropriation of about $667,000 pending further information from the DOC.

3. News Coverage of EM:

Kilgore, James, “E-Carceration: The Problematic World of Being On An Electronic Monitor,” Alternet, October 20, 2016  http://www.alternet.org/human-rights/electronic-monitoring-restrictive-and-wrong

____________ “The Rise of Electronic Monitoring in the Criminal Justice System” , April 30,2012 at:  http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/30/the-rise-of-electronic-monitoring-in-criminal-justice/

__________ “Would you like an ankle bracelet with that?”  Dissent magazine (2011) on line at:  http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=4106

 

 

Henessey-Fiske. “Immigrants Object to Growing Use of Ankle Monitors After Detention,” LA Times, August 2, 2015. http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-immigrant-ankle-monitors-20150802-story.html

Cohen, Donald. “The Private Prison Industry Has a Backup Plan.” The Huffington Post, September 7, 2016, accessed June 9, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/the-private-prison-indust_b_11996936.html

“As mass incarceration has become a national issue, CCA and GEO Group have seen the writing on the wall. For over a decade, they’ve been “diversifying” beyond operating jails and prisons and into other parts of the U.S. criminal justice system. They’ve taken the same business model that produces more violence and recidivism in private prisons and applied it to GPS ankle monitoring, prison health care, and residential reentry centers (“halfway houses”).”

 

Joseph, George. “The Private Prison Industry’s New Criminal Justice Ventures.” The Atlantic’s CityLab, September 14, 2016, accessed June 9, 2017. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/09/the-private-prison-industrys-new-criminal-justice-ventures/499964/

“In conversations with investors, private prison companies have been quite clear that this diversification seeks to meet the demands of the changing political climate. As Ann Schlarb, a senior vice president of GEO Group, explained at the company’s latest earnings call in April (transcript via Seeking Alpha), the company is ‘enthusiastic’ about expanding its offender rehabilitation services, which they believe is ‘in line with current criminal justice reform discussions.’”

“Private companies could have an incentive to see people fall behind on their payments in order to accrue additional late fees, and failure to pay can result in re-incarceration.”

 

Mann, Jennifer. “St. Louis Courts Add Supervision for Better Results.” St. Louis Dispatch, November 18, 2012, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-courts-add-supervision-to-bail-for-better-results/article_e1db3315-baf2-53b1-860e-9f188cb0e631.html

Haywood, Phaedra. “County Lowers Fees for Ankle Monitoring.” Santa Fe New Mexican, December 11, 2007, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/county-lowers-fees-for-ankle-monitoring/article_fb7695f4-a2e9-5fa4-97d4-74b56c01687a.html

Beaudet, Mike. “Ankle Bracelet Breakdown: Mass. Losing Track of Criminals.” Boston 25News, April 23, 2015, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.fox25boston.com/news/fox-25-investigates/ankle-bracelet-breakdown-mass-losing-track-of-criminals/143478092

Discusses technological malfunctions of EM. Lawyer of person awaiting trial gives statement “‘I will be conservative to estimate that I have had at least five or six people who are on probation who have not violated the terms of their probation who have been arrested, put in jail and stayed in jail until they were transported to this courtroom only then to be released despite the fact that they had not violated the terms of their probation…’”

 

St. John, Paige. “Tests Found Major Flaws in Parolee GPS Monitoring Services.” LA Times, March 30, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017. http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/local/la-me-ff-gps-monitors-20130331

Survey of electronic monitoring in California revealed that “Corrections officials found the devices used in half the state were so inaccurate and unreliable that the public was ‘in imminent danger.’”

“Without revealing full details of the tests, officials declared 3M’s devices so faulty that the state rejected the company’s bid. When 3M protested, Milano began a second round of tests that she said showed 3M’s ankle monitors posed a public safety emergency.

The state claimed that 3M’s devices failed to meet 46 of 102 field-tested standards for the equipment, although the company said a fourth of the failures occurred because the state had not provided the phone numbers needed to send automated text alerts.”

Wood, Graeme (2010) “Prison Without Walls,” Atlantic Magazine, available at:  http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/prison-without-walls/308195/

One of the early attempts by a journalist to foresee where electronic monitoring was headed as a technology and as a possible foundation for the building of “prisons without walls.”

Osher, Christopher. “Electronic Monitoring of Colorado Has its Pitfalls.” Denver Post, June 8, 2013, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.denverpost.com/2013/06/08/electronic-monitoring-of-colorado-parolees-has-pitfalls/

Shows the technological/bureaucratic failures of EM.

Davis, Stephen and Polycn, Bryan. “Offenders threatened, jailed for ‘false’ alerts from alcohol-monitoring bracelets: ‘I didn’t do anything wrong!’” Fox4Now, March 13, 2016, accessed July 10, 2017. http://fox6now.com/2016/03/13/alcohol-monitoring-bracelets-questioned/

Conservative take on EM malfunctions. However, the fact that they choose to report on it at all shows it is a relevant enough issue. “Joel Clifford now wonders if an alcohol-based chemical detergent they use at the bar might have triggered his alert. ‘I had my hands on the dishes all night,’ he said. ‘You’re rotating your hands through a dishwasher. You’re getting that chemical right into your skin. And it read as I was drinking.’”

West, Darrell. “How Digital Technology Can Reduce Prison Incarceration Rates.” Newsweek, April 3, 2015, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/how-digital-technology-can-reduce-prison-incarceration-rates-319386

Shapiro, Joseph. “Measures Aimed at Keeping People Out of Jail Punish the Poor.” NPR, May 24, 2014, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.npr.org/2014/05/24/314866421/measures-aimed-at-keeping-people-out-of-jail-punish-the-poor

Chronicles story of man who stole a beer from a convenience store, was put on probation, but was unable to pay for EM. Resulted in spending 12 months in prison and donated plasma continuously to pay for the EM. A struggling addict, AA helped pay the fees, which helped. However, the fees continue to be a burden on him and stand in the way of his recovery.

Shapiro, Joseph. “Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtor’s Prison.” NPR, May 21, 2014, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons

Discussing ways in which debtor’s prison continues. Not specifically discussing EM, but is an important theme that EM is implicated in.

“State-by-State Court Fees.” NPR, May 19, 2014, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees

Helpful graphic on all 50 states’ usage of EM from NPR’s investigation into EM and debt for incarcerated people.

Carlson, Rick. “Guest: Oversight lacking for companies monitoring DUI offenders.” Seattle Times, September 29, 2013, accessed July 10, 2017. http://old.seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2021914769_rickcarlsonopedduimonitoring30xml.html

Editorial from law enforcement on the dangers of having people serving EM choosing their private monitoring company. Lack of public oversight! “The owners of these companies may say that they run responsible programs, and this is probably true of some, but is that good enough? Consider this: In addition to the deficiencies previously mentioned, the records of electronic-home-detention companies are not subject to public-disclosure laws and there is no state agency responsible for regulating or auditing these companies.”

Koran, Mario. “Lost Signals Disconnected Lives.” Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism, March 24, 2013, accessed June 9, 2017. http://wisconsinwatch.org/2013/03/lost-signals-disconnected-lives/

Continuous threat of malfunction of GPS.

  • “I never knew when I was going to go back to jail,” Murphy said. “It was psychological torture.”
  • “Hicks has been booked into jail at least a dozen times since April 2011 for violations related to his GPS monitor, spending a total of 74 days behind bars.”
  • “The records show that Hicks, 39, who served 12 years for having intercourse with an unconscious woman, has asked on multiple occasions to have his parole revoked and be sent back to prison. He told the Center he did so because, in prison, he knew what was expected of him.”
  • “Gable estimates that 250,000 individuals are being electronically monitored in the United States today, about one in 10 by GPS technology. More widely used is radio frequency monitoring, which tethers individuals to a base station inside their homes, effectively a form of house arrest. If they travel outside the perimeter without approval, authorities are notified.”
  • “‘GPS tracking is an example of public fear that has been augmented by politicians who want to be tough on crime,’ Gable said. ‘It’s a wayward technology that has become warped into a punishment routine.’”
  • “In 2007, a legislative study committee in Arizona measured the effectiveness of using GPS technology to track offenders. It found that the 140 offenders monitored that year experienced a total of 35,601 false alerts, due to problems such as low batteries or signals lost in dead zones. The study group found 463 confirmed violations, meaning that false alerts outnumbered proven infractions by a 77-1 margin.”
  • “In fiscal year 2011-12, the state paid BI $4.2 million for services including GPS monitoring units, home monitoring units, and electronic alcohol-detection units, according to the Legislative Fiscal Bureau. The DOC was unable to say how much was specifically spent on GPS.”

 

Lewis, Robert. “Close Rikers? There’s an App for That.” WNYC, March 21, 2016, accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.wnyc.org/story/close-rikers-theres-app/

McKinley, James C. “New Monitoring Program Aims to Keep Youths Out of Riker’s Island.” The New York Times, August 14, 2015, accessed July 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/nyregion/new-monitoring-program-aims-to-keep-youths-out-of-rikers-island.html?_r=0

New York District Attorney discussed the pilot EM program for minors in New York: “‘We are trying to find ways to have only those people in custody who need to be in custody,’ Mr. Vance said in an interview. ‘There is a certain class of folks where we are evaluating whether we can do better than the traditional stay on Rikers.’”

On how the state is getting more and more involved in the daily routine of a “‘certain class of folks.’”: “Karen Friedman Agnifilo, the chief assistant district attorney in Manhattan, said a daily program would be designed for each defendant, along with a strict schedule that might include school, jobs, therapy, drug treatment, a curfew and other activities.”

“‘These people are people for whom, maybe, we can use this arrest and this prosecution as an opportunity to change their direction,” Ms. Friedman Agnifilo said. ‘We can keep these children on the straight and narrow through technology.’

Main question that I have is if these programs’ relevance relies on rehabilitation, are there actually sufficient resources for people to pursue treatment. Also, treatment is not relevant for many of these cases, as they are targeting petty theft and drug dealing, which is often a result of poverty, which is not “treatable” by drug rehab or something of the like.

 

Wexler, Rebecca. “When a Computer Keeps You in Jail.” The New York Times, June 13, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html

“The root of the problem is that automated criminal justice technologies are largely privately owned and sold for profit. The developers tend to view their technologies as trade secrets. As a result, they often refuse to disclose details about how their tools work, even to criminal defendants and their attorneys, even under a protective order, even in the controlled context of a criminal proceeding or parole hearing.”

 

Balsamo, Michael. “Study: California GPS rules send California Juveniles into Jail Cycle.” 89.3 KPCC, July 12, 2017, accessed July 17, 2017. http://www.scpr.org/news/2017/07/12/73716/study-gps-rules-send-california-juveniles-into-jai/

“Weisburd, who defends juveniles in court, said one of her teenage clients was arrested for trying to steal a classmate’s backpack and was sentenced to probation with electronic monitoring. The teenager, who has attention deficit hyperactivity order, just couldn’t stay in his house and repeatedly violated the monitoring rules, she said. The teen cy         `cled in and out of juvenile detention center seven times, she said.”

 

Gambacorta, David and Melamed, Samantha. “Has a Bold Plan Helped to shrink Philly’s Prison Population?” Philly.com, April 12, 2017, accessed July 17, 2017. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/Has-a-bold-plan-helped-to-shrink-Phillys-prison-population-.html

Discusses the “early bail program” in Philadelphia aiming to reduce rates of incarceration using grant money from the MacArthur Foundation with a goal of reducing prison population by 34% over three years. Generally positive review of it. However, raises interesting questions about origins of reform- where the money is coming from, who is benefiting– in this case, a grant from a foundation and “non-violent” offenders.

4.  People of Color Perceptions of EM:

 

Spelman, W. “The severity of intermediate sanctions,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 32(2): 107–135 (1995).

  • “75% of offenders rated one or more intermediate sanctions as more severe than an incarcerative sanction…” (107).
  • “The question of interest, then is not whether there is any range of imprisonment and non prison sanctions that would be perceived as interchangeable, but whether, within the range of sanctions typically applied, there is sufficient scope for interchangeability that the concept can be practically useful” (109).

Researchers seek to address the question of why many people would prefer jail time to a longer, intensive supervision sentence, and attributes it to a number of factors:

  • “The county in which the offender was adjudicated, the length and type of sentence the offender assumed… the offender’s criminal record… the offender’s demographic characteristics…” (122).
  • “Holding all other variables constant, 87% of Black respondents preferred a short jail term to 2 years on intensive supervision; 68% of Hispanics felt this way, but only 41% of White and Pacific Asian respondents did” (123).
  • “Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to prefer jail to intensive supervision, and their comments suggest that differences in supervision may be one reason. A Houston drug dealer, interviewed prison, told us, ‘Intensive supervision is hard on a Black man. Blacks get treated worse, even by Black POs’” (125).
  • Points to the subjective nature of sanctions, how offenders perceive their enforcement due to demographic differences:

“…two offenders may receive the same number of exchange units– or even identical punishments– but perceive the severity of their punishment to be very different due to differences in their age, race, sex, prior punishment history, or other factors” (132).

May, David P., Payne, Bryan K., Wood, Peter B. “The ‘Pains’ of Electronic Monitoring: A Slap on the Wrist or Just as Bad as Prison?” Criminal Justice Studies 27 no. 2 (2014): 133-145.

Results of this study show that those who had never experienced EM view it as less punitive than those who had experienced it, of a sample of over 1200 people in a Midwestern penitentiary. Results showed that Black offenders were more likely to have experienced EM than white offenders, complementing research that shows POC view EM as more negative than their white counterparts. This could be due to POC’s disproportionate incarceration rates, their greater exposure to EM (and therefore their more negative opinions towards it), or that POC are more likely to receive sentencing with EM.

 

DeMichele, Matthew, Okafo, Nonso, and Payne, Brian K. “Attitudes about electronic monitoring: Minority and majority racial group differences.” 37 Journal of Criminal Justice 2 (March/April 2009): 155-162.

This study focuses on the perceptions of EM from college students at a HBU and another non-HBU university to test societal perceptions and collective memory of different demographics.

Why research relating to the different experiences of EM for white and black people is important:

  1. Societal attitudes show general sentiments regarding societal norms/rules
  2. “…understanding the variability in group members’ attitudinal differences of electronic monitoring will inform policymakers, administrators, and researchers of specific cultural perceptions about this intermediate sanction.”
  3. “…because misconceptions of community-based sanctions have resulted in demands for more incarceration (Mauer, 1997; Petersilia, 2003), determining racial group member attitudinal differences is one of the first steps to assessing whether increased public awareness about this community-based sanction is needed.”
  4. Research has showed that there is a compelling relationship between perceptions of a sanction and its effectiveness in achieving its expressed goals.
  5. Perceptions of sanctions reveals whether they will meet resistance from the public.

Establishes that the criminal justice system disproportionately targets people of color, particularly Black Americans.

  • “This research tested group threat theories, and supported the contention that as minority populations increase, majority members will institute policies and practices to prevent minorities from threatening social, political, and economic structures (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996).”
  • “Taking this line of reasoning a step further, it is plausible to suggest that minority and majority racial group members develop different collective memories of the justice system, shaping their perspectives and attitudes toward various justice system policies. These collective memories are rooted in perceptions of past and current experiences and events and contribute to developing distinct racial culture elements (see Bourdieu, 1990; DiMaggio, 1997; Sewell, 1992).”
  • Background research is not necessary conclusive but points to many concerning aspects of the punitive nature of EM that are tremendously classed and racialized: “Some have noted that electronic monitoring may serve to widen the justice system’s net by punishing offenders who otherwise would have avoided formal sanctions (Jackson, de Keijser, & Michon, 1995; Maineprize, 1992; Sigler & Lamb, 1995). Others pointed to the possibility that the sanction unfairly punishes economically disadvantaged individuals who serve their sentences in more Spartan conditions than their wealthier counterparts (Cheever, 1990; Payne & Gainey, 2000). Research supported the contention that electronically monitored house arrest is experienced by many offenders as extremely punitive and intrusive (Brown & Elrod, 1995; Lilly, Ball, Curry, & Smith, 1992; Schmidt, 1991). Still others suggested that electronic monitoring inconsistently punished offenders because different kinds of offenders experienced the sanction differently (Crouch, 1993; Payne & Gainey, 2000).”
  • Role of Collective Memory in influencing perception of EM: “Indeed, minorities may experience formal sanctions differently because of different perceptions about specific types of punishment. In particular, groups may vary in their perceptions of the utility and appropriateness of electronic monitoring due to collective memories of past justice system treatment.”
  • Findings:
    • “Blacks were more likely to agree that the sanction was a severe punishment. In all, nearly one-fourth of Blacks (n = 153) agreed that the sanction was a severe punishment, as compared to less than one-sixth of Whites (chi square = 6.16, p = .013, phi = .11).Blacks were more likely to agree that the sanction discriminates against the poor. About one-third of Blacks agreed with this statement, as compared to one-fifth of Whites (chi square = 16.11, p = .000, phi = .24).
      Blacks were more likely to agree that electronic monitoring turns the home into a prison. In all, 37.8 percent of Blacks agreed with this statement, as compared to about 30 percent of Whites (chi square = 4.94, p = .043, phi = .09). Blacks were more likely to agree that the sanction is more likely to be given to wealthy offenders. Approximately 58 percent of Blacks agreed with this statement, as compared to half of Whites (chi square = 4.92, p = .043, phi = .09). Blacks were more than twice as likely to agree that electronic monitoring perpetuates a racist system. More than a third of Blacks agreed with this statement, as compared to one-sixth of Whites (chi square = 22.57, p = .000, phi = .20). Blacks were more likely to agree that the sanction was unfair because wealthier individuals stay in nicer arrangements. Nearly half of Blacks agreed with this statement as compared to 28.9 percent of Whites (chi square = 7.86, p = .005, phi = .12).”
    • “The regression slopes can be interpreted as showing that Whites have significantly stronger attitudes that electronic monitoring is not applied unfairly. These items can be interpreted as suggesting that significant differences exist to explain differences in the level of inequality perceived in electronic monitoring policies.”
  • Findings show: “The findings showed that attitudinal differences exist between minorities and non-minorities, and much of these differences can be attributed to perceptions about the inequality that minorities see in the application of the electronic monitoring sanction.”
  1. These findings demonstrate cultural and subcultural perceptions of this punishment, informed by collective memory
  2. This knowledge is helpful for public awareness campaigns and demonstrate misperceptions: “In particular, members of the public should be educated about the following aspects of electronic monitoring: (1) the punitiveness of the sanction, (2) the strengths and weaknesses of the sanction, (3) the goals and purposes of the strategies, (4) the cost of electronic monitoring, and (5) evidence of program effectiveness (Gainey & Payne, 2003).”
  3. These experiences and perceptions based on demographics is important for officers administering EM to understand: “What this suggests is that practitioners should recognize that offenders’ cultural memories will likely influence their punishment experience.”
  4. “Researchers and practitioners should work together to determine whether the attitudes uncovered in this study are the source of offenders’ perceptions about community-based sanctions.”
    “Based on this, one must question whether the source of inmates’ preferences for prison over probation are rooted in culturally shaped (not determined) factors promoting specific images and understandings of electronic monitoring.”
  5. Perception of these sanctions speak to their effectiveness and “The sanction was not perceived as punitive, and the deterrent potential was not recognized by respondents. Also, the fact that minorities see that sanction as perpetuating inequality potentially means that the sanction has the capacity to be criminogenic rather than preventive in nature.”
  6. Questions the response/ level of pushback “… researchers must broaden their perspective and consider the way that this community-based sanction, as well as others, might be perceived, and experienced, as discriminatory and prejudicial.”

Wood P.B. and May D.C. “Racial Differences in Perceptions of the Severity of Sanctions: A Comparison of Prison Alternatives.” Justice Quarterly 20 (2003): 605-631.

Study looking to examine the racialized differences in the experiences of EM. Seeks to address other factors that may contribute to the experience of EM, including type of crime, previous incarceration, etc. Found that race and previous experience with EM greatly impacted people’s’ perception of EM.

“Thus, while there are doubtless many other ways in which black and white probationers in our sample differed, the results in Tables 1 and 2 show that they did not differ significantly with respect to age, gender, education, parenthood, living with children, receiving public assistance in the past year, having a felony conviction, or prior experience serving the alternatives other than EM.”

“Within each imprisonment index (4, 8, 12 months) and for every alternative in Table 4, blacks were more likely than whites to choose prison. The modal pattern is that 20%-30% of black probationers would choose prison, rather than the alternative, compared to 1%-15% of white probationers. Given the choice between prison and county jail, boot camp, EM, and halfway house, blacks were two to three times more likely to choose prison than were whites. With regard to regular probation, day reporting, ISP, intermittent incarceration, and day fine, blacks were anywhere from three to six times more likely to choose prison than were whites. For example, in the 4-month index, 25.0% of blacks but only 3.8% of whites chose prison over ISP. Clearly, when given a choice between prison and alternative sanctions, blacks voiced a stronger preference for prison than did whites.”
“Observe that for each alternative and within each length of imprisonment, blacks rated the alternative sanction as more punitive than did whites. For example, whereas whites were willing to serve 6.32 months of EM to avoid 4 months of imprisonment, blacks were willing to serve only 2.96 months. In many instances, whites were willing to serve twice as much of the alternative as were blacks to avoid a specific duration of imprisonment. Furthermore, the racial differences presented in Table 5 are significant at the .01 level for all comparisons except county jail. Not only were blacks more likely to choose prison than were whites (see Table 4), but whites were willing to serve significantly more of each alternative than were blacks.”
Discussion:

  • “We found that black probationers are more likely than whites to refuse to participate in alternative sanctions, that blacks are more likely than whites to choose imprisonment over alternatives, and that among offenders who are willing to serve alternatives to avoid prison, whites will serve longer durations of them.”
  • Why is this?: “(1) blacks perceive prison as less punitive than whites and are therefore more likely to choose prison than are whites, regardless of issues related to alternatives; (2) blacks perceive alternatives as too much of a hassle compared to prison, with abusive program officers and rules that are too hard to follow; and (3) blacks perceive a significantly higher risk of revocation associated with alternatives than do whites, which increases the “gamble” of participating in them. These three dynamics may operate in tandem to generate the racial differences found in our study, although which is the most influential remains uncertain.”

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/mar/15/electronic-monitoring-some-causes-for-concern/

“With respect to immigrants, in 2009 BI signed a five-year, $372 million contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to monitor some 27,000 people awaiting asylum or deportation hearings. In the high school student market, a major EM firm in Texas, iSECUREtrac, funded a pilot monitoring project for students with truancy records in a largely Black and Latino school district in Dallas.”

 

Payne, B. K., & Gainey, R. R. “The influence of demographic factors on the experience of house arrest.” Federal Probation, 66(3) (2002): 64-70.

This study looks at the role of race, gender, and age in people’s attitudes and experiences of EM. The study also looked at the role of length of sentence and severity of EM.
“In terms of race, it is important that probation officers recognize that black offenders may see the sanction as more restrictive than white offenders do. In part, this may explain why black offenders have been found to prefer incarceration over probation (Crouch, 1993). As far as practical implications are concerned, probation officers supervising monitored offenders should make offenders aware of the restrictions prior to placing them on the sanction so that they are better prepared to deal with the restrictions. On a related matter, offenders and their family members should be told beforehand about the way that the sanction could influence family relations.”

 

Crouch, Ben M. “Is Incarceration Really Worse–Analysis of Offenders’ Preferences for Prison over Probation.” 10.1 Justice Quarterly 67 (1993): 88.

Explores the socialization of different groups contributing to their experiences of prison and alternative sanctions. Cites background research arguing that low income Black Americans are often more able to “adapt” to prison due to ghettoized communities (and the self-protection methods) they were raised to adjust to, as well as the familial connections maintained in prison due to mass incarceration of Black men. This study focused on over 1,000 incarcerated men in Texas. Researcher hypothesized that those/ their community with greater experience with the criminal justice system would prefer prison over alternative sanctions. This was not entirely upheld in study’s findings.

“Similarly, in the late 1980s in Texas, probation officers and prosecuting attorneys began to note that prisoners increasingly were requesting prison and trying to avoid probation. One surprised Texas judge stated, “Not in my wildest six years on the bench has this ever come up before… I’ve had (offenders ask) for probation instead of prison, but I’ve never had one… ask me to do away with probation and go to prison” (Bryan-College Station Eagle 1991). Such preferences are surprising because at least through the mid-1980s, (Crouch and Marquart 1989) probation was always viewed as a break for the offender, especially in a state such as Texas, with its history of tough prisons.”

“That is, a preference for prison is more likely among offenders who are African-American, older, unmarried, and widely exposed to crime and institutional corrections, and who share beliefs that probation has grown stricter and that other offenders now prefer prison to probation” (84).

5. Perspectives of those who support EM:

Latzer, Barry, “Electronic monitoring can be a boon to criminal justice reform,” National Review, December 7, 2017 http://www.nationalreview.com/article/454418/electronic-monitoring-key-criminal-justice-reform

An exuberantly positive argument in favor of EM as “the most promising criminal justice reform of the early 21st century.” Latzer totally dismisses any claims that individuals with a criminal background might have on privacy and moves straight ahead to argue for the surveillance of GPS monitors.

Wiseman, Samuel R., “Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, Yale Law Journal, 123(5) March 2014

Yeh, Stuart, “The Electronic Monitoring Paradigm: A Proposal for Reform,” Laws, 2014, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/4/1/60/pdf

http://www.yalelawjournal.org/essay/pretrial-detention-and-the-right-to-be-monitored

Thesis:

“That is the argument I advance here: (1) that poor, non-dangerous criminal defendants are a discrete constituency in need of judicial protection because they are effectively locked out of the political process (an argument vividly illustrated by their current treatment under the Bail Reform Act), and because historic efforts at reform have repeatedly failed; (2) that, while further studies are needed, electronic pretrial monitoring is, or will soon be, a less expensive, less burdensome, and judicially administrable alternative to money bail for ensuring appearance at trial; and (3) that the emergence of this alternative necessitates a new jurisprudence of excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment prohibition of “[e]xcessive bail.””

Simplistic, overly optimistic about the future of monitoring. Also, acts as those who would be under monitoring are somehow different than the general population:

“Largely omitted, however, from these larger debates is discussion of where new government technology would be most beneficial.15 Although placing GPS monitors on the free population would impose enormous privacy costs, for those whom the government is already allowed to imprison in pursuit of its goals, technology that allows those goals to be achieved less obtrusively is a nearly unalloyed good.”

System of Money bail is archaic:

“This system of money bail is an archaic institution, a holdover from times when there were few police officers and jails and when fleeing across a county or state line was more likely to be an effective means of avoiding trial;28 requiring an individual or family members to post something of value was a necessary and reasonable means of preventing flight.”

is this really escaped when we turn to electronic monitoring?
“Non-dangerous individuals jailed to prevent flight suffer the same harms as those detained for safety reasons—the same harms suffered by convicted defendants.33 They are taken from their communities and physically barred from the outside world, restricted to limited visits by family members and attorneys.34 Their conversations are constantly monitored by guards and other inmates, their mail is searched, and they are subjected to frequent and invasive searches and pat-downs to ensure institutional security.35 To compound the gravity of the harm, these high liberty and privacy burdens are often prolonged; despite speedy trial requirements, many defendants awaiting trial are detained for months.36

Argues for the criminogenic nature of jail and its adverse effects. Does not address how surveillance will impact behavior:

“Predictably, incarceration multiplies the chances that the accused will learn criminal behavior.39 Those accused of drug possession may develop new addictions, and non-violent criminals may quickly learn violence (if only to defend themselves at first40). As months pass and new defendants arrive, desperation may set in, leaving a potentially permanent mark and possibly lingering violent tendencies.41

Burdens of pre-trial detention:

  1. Criminogenic nature of jail, plea-inducing: One of the main premises is that those who are not given the option of bail, or cannot afford it, are more likely to be convicted/ accept plea bargains. The option of EM theoretically enables more people to persevere through trial: “Faced with these high defense burdens, defendants jailed pretrial often accept plea bargains in lieu of persevering through trial. In some cases, the periods that defendants spend in jail awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential sentences,48 thus substantially incentivizing quick plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence. One empirical study found that of the federal pretrial detainees in 1987 and 1988, about eighty-five percent were criminally convicted, and that the majority of these convictions appeared to have “resulted from some form of plea bargaining.”49
  2. Financial burden of pre-trial imprisonment: cannot contribute to payments, often lose their jobs
  3. Tax burden of holding people pre-trial: “The American Bar Association notes that “the taxpayer implications of pretrial detention are significant given the expenses of operating detention facilities,” observing that “New York City spends approximately $45,000 annually to house a single pre-trial detainee.”55

Problems with Money Bail

  1. Discrimination based on income: “‘One purpose for imposing a higher [bail] amount which would be consistent with the theory of bail would be that the increase in the defendant’s financial stake reduces the likelihood of non-appearance at his trial. In practice, however, higher bail usually means that appearance in court is being obtained by holding the defendant behind bars.65
  2. Financial burden of bail:
  • Disables families from spending money on cost of daily living
  • “This tragedy is not unavoidable, but rather has been perpetuated despite the availability of technology to meaningfully enhance equality, privacy, and liberty, and at a much lower cost than the current system.”
  1. Money bail is ineffective: “…bail bonds of any type do not perfectly achieve their goal of ensuring a defendant’s presence at trial; the system tolerates a relatively high level of failure as compared to the alternative of jailing all individuals, which would guarantee nearly perfect appearance rates. This failure is likely due to flight incentives that remain despite technological advances in tracking and monitoring defendants.” Intense focus on the need to develop more advanced technology to solve these problems.
  2. Traditional money bail alternatives do not work

Proposed Solution: Electronic Monitoring.

However, EM is not at a place legislatively or technologically to be the alternative for money bail: “both the statutory and constitutional arguments for a right to monitoring depend on demonstrating that monitoring is at least as effective and inexpensive as money bail.89

What keeps EM from being the alternative?

  • Practical concerns over the technological proficiency of it and disabling flight risk: “Technology, then, cannot completely eliminate pretrial detention for flight risk; at most, by being more effective than money bail, it could narrow the class of defendants considered too great of a flight risk to release (most of whom, under contemporary practice, would be detained for dangerousness anyway). But this is not a particularly serious objection: the principal beneficiaries of replacing money bail with monitoring are not those who, facing serious charges, have too much at stake to be released, but those who, facing less serious charges, simply have too little to stake. These concerns, moreover, can also be addressed by imposing higher penalties for failing to appear while monitored or for tampering with a monitoring device.133
    “Technology might not be able to completely eliminate detention for flight risk, but it should be able to eliminate detention for poverty.”
  • Questions of cost: it’s more affordable on the taxpayer! Less resources are needed – this is a questionable claim in some ways because there is significant technological advancement needed and administrative support that is currently not in place. Ultimately, it is convincing that it is less expensive, but should not be taken at face value.

Surprising argument for privatization:

Governments need not operate the programs themselves: already, multiple competing private providers exist (and one could imagine bond agents, some of whom already use tracking devices, becoming monitoring agents).144

Acknowledges that this is the better of two evils:

“If electronic monitoring is implemented on a broader scale, more legislatures will try to recoup the costs of monitoring from indigent defendants as they have done with counsel 147 and jail costs.148 As others have noted, this is deeply problematic,149 but it is still preferable to detention (which defendants might also have to pay for).”

Privacy Concerns:

Acknowledges that EM is a serious invasion of privacy. Argues that although this is true, majority of those experiencing it prefer EM to imprisonment. This can be rebutted through research, particularly those of people of color.

On the Better of Evils:

“And in the absence of other realistic options for systemic reform, the perfect must not be the enemy of the good.”

The Threat of Slippery Slope in Technological Surveillance: “Although the prospect of the government requiring all citizens to wear ankle monitors or, worse, a pair of Google glasses that upload everything we see and hear to the Internet, is indeed a frightening one, using monitoring in lieu of detention is unlikely to move us meaningfully closer to that nightmare scenario.”

  • This is a concerning argument because of the crisis of mass incarceration. If this surveillance were to expand, the reality is that it would disproportionately affect communities of color. It would be “that nightmare scenario” disproportionately for these communities due to who is arrested and tried for crimes.

 

The Threat of EM Expansion:

 “Turning to the narrower class of pretrial defendants eligible for release, the risk is that expanding the use of monitoring as an alternative to detention will lead to the increased use of monitoring on defendants who would previously have been released on bail, personal recognizance, or other less restrictive conditions.164 And, to some extent, it likely would: once a monitoring infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of adding to the monitored population is likely to be relatively low, and if monitoring is more effective at producing presence at trial than the alternatives, policymakers will have an incentive to use it.”
“On the whole, then, Orwellian fears about monitoring—however well justified elsewhere—are not as strong in the context of its use as a substitute for pretrial detention for failure to post bond.”

Excessive Bail Clause, Constitutional Concerns:

 “Excessive Bail Clause is the provision that speaks directly to pretrial detention, and the strongest case for a right to monitoring rests on it.”

-Existing judicial scrutiny does not provide a way to measure whether a method of pre-trial detention is excessive (in US v. Salerno)

-This gives no way to measure methods of electronic monitoring as appropriate v. excessive- through money? Through other means?

Arguing that a bond requirement is excessive when EM is an option:

“at least an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied to the fit between the legislature’s goals for its system of pretrial release and the means employed to achieve them. Applying this standard, which requires that the means chosen not be “substantially broader than necessary to achieve [the government’s] interest,”182 a bond requirement resulting in detention is clearly excessive if monitoring could serve the state’s goals equally well (and equally efficiently).”

  • This requires proving EM’s superiority in effectiveness

“Nonetheless, assuming that the “only arguable substantive limitation” imposed by the Excessive Bail Clause—the prohibition on excessive means of achieving desired bail purposes—does in fact exist, the continued detention of impecunious defendants despite the existence of cost-effective alternatives to ensuring their presence at trial conflicts with even this rather stunted conception of pretrial liberty.”

  • How to define the limits of the Salerno decision– who gets bail and how?
  • Argument that, in order to address the modern context, EM is necessary

“The right to remain free before trial—albeit within a somewhat intrusive monitoring regime—seems to rest comfortably alongside, or even above, other rights often cited as necessary to free citizenship.”

Arguments for the way forward:

  • Argues that “A right to the alternative would simply be an option to select monitoring in lieu of pretrial release.”
  • Believes that the courts should lead the charge for EM, and who and when it is implemented
  • Argument for EM as a way to reform the criminal justice system that needs to prove its effectiveness as the field is very wary of reforms which taxpayers see as their responsibility to foot the bill

 

Altman, R. N., Murray, R. E., & Wooten, E. B. “Home confinement: A ‘90s approach to community supervision.” Federal Probation, 61 (1997): 30-32.

Touches on the difficulty for enforcement officers, as well as the potential for cost saving on the part of the government. Explores the difficulties that ineffective technology cause for the officer, including poor weather affecting EM. Shows that officers need to anticipate these difficulties, as do the participants– ready to take and place call at all hours. Argues that EM does not stop criminal behavior, but does provide enforcement more information about how to successfully “tailor” a participant’s sentence to meet their behavior. This directly addresses the surveillance of EM to not simply ensure that participants are remaining in their homes and attending treatment programs, if applicable. The state is able to gather more and more information about those in the criminal justice system.

“In a profession that has few avenues for creativity and where so-called innovations seem to be recycled every 10 or 20 years, developing technology has recently paved the way for a cost-saving alternative to detention and incarceration.”

“Home confinement is a demanding sentence for the participant as well as the home confinement officer. Home confinement affects not only the participant but household members as well. For some participants it is the first time that they have scheduled any portion of their lives. They must have permission to go to the doctor, see their attorney, or even go to the grocery store. Many must ask others to do their shopping, pick up the laundry, or take the children to school. Some participants are unable to attend family events or even leave their residence to pick up the mail or wash the car. Home confinement officers’ responsibilities are different than those of their colleagues. Home confinement supervision is labor intensive. In essence, officers are “on call” 24 hours a day, 7 days a week because they must respond anytime there is a potential violation. The work is demanding: alerts average 10 per officer per day in the federal program, many after normal work hours. Nationally, this is an average of nearly 34,000 alerts per month. Officers also process an average of 12,500 routine schedule changes and install or remove an average of 1,500 monitoring units each month.”
“Home confinement will provide the court with more information with which to tailor a sentence for the needs of the person and the community and additional supervision tools for officers.”

Friel, Charles M.; Vaughn, Joseph B. “A Consumer’s Guide to the Electronic Monitoring of Probationers.” Federal Probation 50 no. 3 (1986): 3-14.

Study surveys probation administrators, those experiencing EM, and manufacturers of EM. Uses war on crime rhetoric, and sees EM as a way to address the public’s fear and desire to imprison people as well as address subsequent overcrowding. Study raised questions about who was an appropriate fit for EM, what the possible abuses of the technology are, and some of the philosophical considerations for the technology. Expressed purpose of the article is to explore the administrative and policy challenges of EM. Raises concerns about cost allotment in the initial investment in EM technology, as opposed to increase salaries, money for programs, etc. Argues that unless there is evidence that EM reduces recidivism, there are no savings “from a public safety perspective.” Highlights cost saving opportunities as a whole. Raises questions about the practical implications of those being considered for EM not having access to a phone to fulfill the requirements of EM.

 

Hucklesby, A. “Insiders’ views: Offenders’ and staff’s experiences of electronically monitored curfews.”  In Electronically Monitored Punishment: International and Critical Perspectives, edited by Nellis M., Beyens K., Kaminski D., 228-246. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Schmidt, Annesley K. “Electronic Monitors—Realistically, What Can Be Expected?” Federal Probation 55 (1991): 47-53.

Article explores the technological, philosophical, and practical concerns from the perspective of probation administration. Provides a summary for those involved in the field– the pros and cons of such programs.

“In summary, when starting a program, it is important to be realistic about why the program is being established and what it is expected to accomplish. In addition, the program needs to be placed in a context that is well thought out, has consistent policies and procedures, and documents events that occur and specific expectations. Above all, monitoring equipment should never be equipment in search of a program.”

Blackwell, B.S., Payne, B.K. & Prevost. “Measuring Electronic Monitoring Tools: The Influence of Vendor Type and Vendor Data,” Journal of American Criminal Justice (2011) 36: 17.

Argues for the necessity of private sector involvement in the increased usage of EM. Explores officer’s opinions on the effectiveness of different companies, technological methods, and issues of installation. “The rise in the use of electronic monitoring tools for management of individuals in both pretrial and post-release correctional stages of the criminal justice system necessitates increased collaboration of criminal justice personnel with private sector companies that provide monitoring services.”

 

http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/02/chief-judges-group-calls-for-changes-in-how-courts-determine-bail.html

Discusses the 2013 Conference of Chief Judges’ resolution that judges should evaluate evidence case by case to determine whether defendants will  prove dangerous to the community as well as “…start with the presumption that defendants in non-violent cases would get a non-bond pretrial release unless proven they would be a danger or flight risk, which could avoid many of the problems cited in a recent Conference of State Administrations policy paper.” Acknowledges the major impact judges can make on low income defendants with seemingly minor decisions they make many of every day. New York Chief Judge John Lippman decried the bail bond system as “‘…as a travesty that judges, prosecutors, don’t make decisions about a person’s liberty, that they’re made on the basis of a profit-making money enterprise,” Lippman said. “That that’s the person who has in many instances the critical role in determining a person’s liberty is outrageous. This is not something we can be proud of.”

 

 

 

 

 

There is a small body of literature that reflects a somewhat critical perspective on electronic monitoring. Here are a few of these publications:

Burrell, W. and R. Gable. (2008) “From B.F. Skinner to Spiderman to Martha Stewart: The past, present, and future of electronic monitoring of offenders.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 46 (3/4) 101-108.

Gable, R. (n.d.) “My professional home page.” Accessed at: http://rgable.wordpress.com/electronic-monitoring-of-criminal-offenders/   September 6, 2012.

Kilgore, James (2012) “Progress or more of the same? Electronic monitoring and parole in the age of mass incarceration,” Critical Criminology, November, available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10612-012-9165-0

___________, (2012) “The Rise of Electronic Monitoring in the Criminal Justice System” Counterpunch, April 30 at:  http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/30/the-rise-of-electronic-monitoring-in-criminal-justice/

_______________. (2011)“Would you like an ankle bracelet with that?”  Dissent magazine on line at:  http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=4106

Koran, M. (2013) “Lost signals, disconnected lives,” Report for Wisconsin Watch March 24. Available at: http://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2013/03/24/lost-signals-disconnected-lives/

Lilly, R. J. (2006) “Issues Beyond Empirical EM Reports,” Criminology and Public Policy. Vol 5, No. 1. 93-101.

____________  (1996) “Profit and Penalty: An analysis of the corrections-commercial complex,” Crime and Delinquency. 42:3-20.

Murphy, E.( 2008). “Paradigms of Restraint”,  Duke Law Journal, 57 Duke I.J. 1323-61.

Nellis, M. and R. Bas (2012) Electronically Monitored Punishment: International and critical perspectives, London: Taylor and Francis.

______. (2005) “Electronic Monitoring, satellite tracking, and the new punitiveness in England and Wales.” J. Pratt et al. (Eds.) The New Punitiveness: Trends, Stories, Perspectives. Portland OR: Willan. 167-88

Paterson, C. (2009) Understanding the Electronic Monitoring of Offenders: Commercial Criminal Justice in England and Wales; Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller.

Payne, B. et al.  (2009) “Attitudes about electronic monitoring: Minority and majority racial group differences.155-62.” Journal of Criminal Justice. 37(2)

Phelan, S. (2010) “Who profits from ICE’s electronic monitoring anklets? San Francisco Bay Guardian Online, March 16, accessed from:  http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2010/03/16/who-profits-ices-electronic-monitoring-anklets-0    on July 9, 2011.

Saletan, W. (2005). “Call my cell: Why GPS tracking is good news for inmates.” Slate. May 7, 2005.  http://www.slate.com/id/2118117/ accessed June 15, 2011.

Shklovski, I. et al. (2009) “The commodification of location: Dynamics of power in location-based systems.” Paper presented to the International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, Orlando, Florida. October 2.

Staples, W. and S. Decker. (2011) “Between the ‘home’ and ‘institutional’ worlds: Tensions and contradictions in the practice of house arrest.” Critical Criminology. 18: 1-20.

Wood, Graeme (2010) “Prison Without Walls,” Atlantic Magazine, available at:  http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/prison-without-walls/308195/

There is a much larger body of mainstream literature which largely reflects a  view of electronic monitoring as a mode of punishment and control. There are at least three bibliographies of this literature:

Development Services Group. (2009). “Home Confinement/Electronic Monitoring Literature Review”. Report to Department of Justice, Washington DC.

N.A. (1996) “An annotated bibliography of electronic monitoring research and literature.” Journal of Offender Monitoring. 9 (1)  11-28.

Vollum, Scott. (2002) “Electronic monitoring: a research review.”  Corrections Compendium, 27 (7).

Some examples of this literature,much of which can be found in the Journal Of Offender Monitoring, include:

Bales, W. et al. (2010) “A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of Electronic Monitoring,” Report Submitted to the Office of Justice Program National Institute of Justice U.S. Department of Justice. January, 2010.

Ballard J. and K. Mullendore, (2002) “Legal Issues Related to Electronic Monitoring Programs”. Journal of Offender Monitoring. Summer/Fall. p. 17.

Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio. (2011) “Policy and Procedures.” Stryker OH.

DeMichele, M. and B.K . Payne, (2009) “Offender supervision with electronic technology.”  Report for Bureau of Justice, Washington D.C. 2nd edition.

Gibbons Media and Research. (2012)  “GPS-Aided Monitoring of Parolees: No Privacy Issues, Just a Large Addressable Market.” Accessed at:  http://www.insidegnss.com/node/3056  September 6, 2012.

Gies, S. et al (2012) “Monitoring High Risk Sex Offenders with GPS Technology: An evaluation of California’s Supervision Program.” Report for National Institute of Justice, Washington DC.

International Association of Police Chiefs. (2008) “Tracking Sex Offenders With Electronic Monitoring Technology: Implications and Practical Uses for Law Enforcement”

Johnston, W. J. (2004) “Let’s Talk About…Offender Pay Programs,” Journal of Offender Monitoring, Winter/Spring 2004. 11-20.

Jolin, A and B. Stipak. (1992). “Drug and treatment and electronically monitored home confinement: An evaluation of a community-based sentencing option.” Crime and Delinquency, 38(2). 158-70.

Jones, M. and D. Ross. (1997). “Electronic house arrest and boot camp in North Carolina: Comparing Recidivism.” Criminal Justice Policy Review, 8 (4), 383-403.

____________ et al. (1993). “Electronic monitoring of the drunk driver: A seven-year study of the home confinement alternative.” Crime and Delinquency, 39 (4) 462-484.

Maxfield, M. G. and T.L. Baumer. (1990) “Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring: Comparing pre-trial and post-conviction programs.” Crime and Delinquency, 36(4) 521-36.

National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, (1999) Online Bulletin, National Institute of Justice,  http://www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/Attachments/859/Elec-Monit.pdf  accessed July 9, 2011

Padgett, K. et al. (2006).  “Under Surveillance: An empirical test of the effectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring.” Criminology and Public Policy 5(1) 61-92.

Schmidt, A.K. (1988) “Use of Electronic Monitoring by Criminal Justice Agencies,” Report for National Criminal Justice Research  Service: Washington DC.